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We examine the research productivity of German academic economists over their life cycles. 
It turns out that the career-patterns of research productivity as measured by journal 
publications are characterized by marked cohort effects. Moreover, the life-cycles of younger 
German economists are hump-shaped and closely resemble the life cycles identified for U.S. 
economists, whereas the life-cycles of older German economists are much flatter. Finally, we 
find that not only productivity, but also research quality follows distinct life cycles. Our study 
employs econometric techniques that are likely to produce estimates that are more trustworthy 
than previous estimates. 
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Life Cycle and Cohort Productivity in Economic Research: 
The case of Germany  
 
1. Introduction 
The science system in general and the economics profession in particular have in recent 
years become subjects of economic inquiry. Stephan (1996) surveys the economics of 
science literature of the first generation, and a survey summarizing the current literature 
dealing with the economics profession is to be found in Coupé (2004). Among the aspects 
that have received a great deal of attention are the methods of measuring research output, 
the identification of the determinants of research productivity, and the analysis of the job 
market consequences of research success.
1 
  As far as the job market consequences of research success are concerned, the 
available literature clearly indicates that research productivity as measured by 
publications and/or citations is a crucial determinant of salary (see, for example, Kenny 
and Studley, 1996, and Moore et al., 2001), tenure and academic rank (see Coupé et al., 
2006), and the obtainable job status in terms of the employing university’s reputation (see 
Grimes and Register, 1997, and Coupé et al., 2006). When it comes to identifying and 
explaining the pattern of research productivity over career time, the empirical evidence 
becomes less clear-cut. Human capital theory suggests a hump-shaped progression of 
individual research productivity since the stock of human capital (which drives high 
productivity) needs to be built up at the beginning of the career, and obsolescence of 
knowledge is likely to dominate the positive effect of increased experience towards the 
                                                 
1 Even though these lines of investigation are, of course, related to the plethora of existing research 
evaluations, they are in no way contaminated with the allegations levelled against the value and 
significance of research evaluations as expressed, for example, by Frey (2007).   3
end of professional life.
2 A standard hump-shaped research productivity curve indeed 
emerges in some empirical studies investigating professional economists (see Kenny and 
Studley, 1996, Oster and Hamermesh, 1998, and Baser and Pema, 2004). It is, however, 
conceivable that the identified hump-shape represents an artifact of the quadratic 
specification of elapsed career time in the employed regressions of research productivity. 
Goodwin and Sauer (1995) identify a more complex career productivity profile that 
follows a fifth degree polynomial, whereas evidence uncovered by Hutchinson and 
Zivney (1995) and Hartley et al. (2001) do not indicate any significant decline in 
productivity as experience increases - a result that is compatible with the view that 
research behavior, rather than being determined by human capital considerations, can be 
explained by sociological factors related to social imprinting. 
  The social imprinting hypothesis suggests that significant variations in research 
behavior may be observed when comparing different cohorts of researchers. So far, 
however, the empirical studies have not uncovered strong cohort effects in the economics 
profession: Basar and Pema (2004) do not find any cohort effects at all, and Goodwin and 
Sauer (1995) report only marginally significant effects which, however, may well reflect 
the fact that the members of the analyzed cohorts differ in age, implying that the older 
cohorts are composed of academic survivors who are likely to have been more productive 
on the average. Notice also that the hitherto available empirical evidence relates to the 
United States; studies relating to countries whose academic institutions were subject to 
major recent changes may exhibit substantially different cohort effects. 
  One of the objectives of our paper is to analyze how the traditional continental 
European science system has responded, on the one hand, to structural changes that 
                                                 
2 For a survey of the literature dealing with how life cycle productivity changes in response to 
changes in cognitive abilities, see Skirbekk (2004).   4
provide more incentives for high research productivity, and, on the other hand, to the 
increased competition stemming from the fact that the European science system has 
become more and more exposed to the global standards set by the Anglo-Saxon system. 
We analyze this transformation process by scrutinizing the research behavior of different 
cohorts of scientists. For this purpose, the German economics profession appears to 
represent a very suitable example because in a large country such as Germany 
international competition was little noticed before the onset of European economic and 
political integration. Moreover, the German economic profession has for a long time been 
dominated by an idiosyncratic approach (the so-called historical school) that virtually 
decoupled the German profession from the emerging mainstream of economic research. 
The initial position of the German profession has thus been quite far removed from the 
mainstream. Moreover, the onset of the transition is reasonably close to the time period 
for which empirical evidence is available. Considering, finally, the success of the 
youngest batch of German economists in the global academic labor market, one can argue 
that the transition process is now coming to an end, implying that we can capture a 
substantial part of the whole adjustment process.    
  In this study we measure research output with the help of publications. There is 
general agreement that publications need to be adjusted for quality if they are used as 
indicators of research productivity. Two ways of controlling for publication quality have 
been employed in the literature: some scholars (for example Goodwin and Sauer, 1995) 
restrict themselves to articles published in a select list of highly reputable journals, 
whereas others (for example Kenny and Studley, 1996, and Coupé et al., 2006) base their 
measure of research productivity on a more encompassing list of journals and use explicit 
quality weights that are based on the respective journals’ scientific impact. Hybrid   5
approaches with two or more quality classes of journals are also quite common (see, for 
example, Grimes and Register, 1997, Oster and Hamermesh, 1998, and Moore et al., 
2001). 
  Since research productivity consists of a quantity and a quality component, the 
identified career patterns can, in principle, be decomposed into a quantity and a quality 
cycle if the quality range of the considered journals is not overly restricted. Particularly 
interesting insights from quality-quantity decompositions refer to heterogeneity in 
research ability. It transpires that quality publishers are in general also quantity publishers 
(see Hutchinson and Zivney, 1995) and that the post-peak decline of the most prolific 
economists is much smaller than the decline of the less productive economists (see 
Grimes and Register, 1997). Oster and Hamermesh (1998) show that top producers keep 
on producing high-quality research, but at a slower rate, whereas the slowdown of 
second-rate economists leads them to publish in lower quality outlets. Truly creative 
economics at the highest level is, however, mainly undertaken by the young (see Oster 
and Hamermesh, 1998, and van Dalen, 1999). 
  A related strand of the literature investigates the impact of institutional features 
on the pattern of research productivity. Of special interest are the influence of entry 
barriers (such as the institution of the “habilitation” which is still exercised in some 
continental European countries), mid-career hurdles such as tenure and rank promotions, 
and also institutional provisions that affect the mobility of academic researchers between 
universities.
3 Entry and promotion barriers have typically been portrayed as contests 
                                                 
3 Such provisions can either be designed to restrain mobility (examples are lock-ins via retirement 
benefits and German-type cartel agreements among university presidents or their superiors in the 
respective governments) or to increase mobility (international mobility of researchers is promoted, 
for example, with the help of the Marie Curie Actions organized and financed by the European 
Commission).    6
designed to induce higher research effort via increased competition (see Backes-Gellner 
and Schlinghoff, 2004, Coupé et al., 2003, and Dnes and Garoupa, 2005). The empirical 
evidence indicates that these institutional provisions do indeed work as incentive schemes 
and thus influence the pattern of research productivity: those life-cycle studies that 
identify hump-shaped productivity patterns usually find that research productivity peaks 
about six years into the professional career, i.e. around the time when professors can 
apply for tenure. The post-tenure decline in productivity appears however to be rather 
small (see Bell and Seater, 1978, and Hutchinson and Zivney, 1995). Somewhat more 
informative results emerge from micro-econometric studies using information about 
when exactly the individual researchers were promoted: Backes-Gellner and Schlinghoff 
(2005) uncover strong evidence for the United States and Germany indicating that 
promotion tournaments give rise to an increase in research productivity before promotion 
and a lapse of productivity afterwards. Moreover, they show that the career profiles of 
German economists is characterized by a more pronounced post-tenure decline than the 
profiles of their American colleagues, the reason being that the German university system 
lacks a second career step, namely promotion to full professor. Analyzing publication 
records of 650 economists who are members of the top-1000 group according to a world-
wide ranking, Coupé et al. (2006) corroborate the result that promotions cause cyclical 
deflections in research productivity: pre-promoted economists are more productive than 
post-promoted ones, and tenure has an additional negative effect on research productivity.  
  The focus of our study is however not on the institutional features of the German 
academic labor market. We rather treat career steps as an endogenous to academic careers 
and relate individual research productivity to career age. The paper unfolds as follows. In 
section 2 we describe our data set and in section 3 we present our base-line estimates of   7
the life cycles in research productivity. We identify life cycles that are akin to, but rather 
flatter than the life cycles of American economists uncovered by Goodwin and Sauer 
(1995). Moreover, we arrive at the result that the German profession is characterized by 
significant cohort effects in research productivity. We also find that the shape of the life 
cycles depends on the individual researchers’ ability. Studies focusing on aggregates thus 
miss an essential part of the story that relates to heterogeneity. In section 4 we then go on 
to investigate cycles in the constituent parts (quantity, quality, number of co-authors) of 
our measure of research productivity. Section 6 concludes.     
 
2. The Data 
2.1 The sample  
Whereas many other bibliometric studies focus on researchers who publish frequently, 
our dataset compromises, in principle, all German academic economists. Our dataset 
encompasses 699 economists who received their doctoral degrees between 1963 and 1998 
and who were employed by a German university in the year 2004 or had retired from a 
German university briefly before.
4 The youngest economists in our sample thus have a 
minimum of six years of post-Ph.D. experience.  
Our study relies on the EconLit data base that contains journal publication records 
from 1969 onwards. In choosing the starting year of 1963 we thus lose only the first six 
years of the 1963-1968 cohort. We measure research output exclusively on the basis of 
the journal literature. This admittedly neglects other types of research outlets such as 
monographs and articles published in collected volumes and proceedings. We are, 
                                                 
4 We gathered information on more than one thousand German economist. Our sample comprises 
however only those economists who obtained their doctoral degree after 1962 and for whom we 
could actually establish the exact year in which they obtained their doctoral degree.    8
however,  in accord with most scholars in the field who are confident that EconLit 
indexes the most important journals of the economics profession and that the articles 
published in these journals together constitute the lion’s share of economic research (see, 
for example, Hartley et al., 2001, Combes and Linnemer, 2003, and Coupé, 2003). 
 We  collected  all  EconLit-listed journal publications authored or co-authored by 
the economists included in our sample up to the year 2004 and linked the annual records 
to the year in which the author obtained his or her doctoral degree.
5 We were thus able to 
establish individual life cycles of research productivity for a large number of German 
economists. These life cycles represent the basic input for our empirical analysis.  
  Only 7 percent of the 699 economists in our sample are women.  Fourteen percent 
specialize in microeconomics, 27 percent in macroeconomics and international 
economics, 35 percent in public economics and 16 percent in econometrics. Economists 
who could not be assigned to one of these fields were assigned to the field OTHER. 
Interestingly, 94 or about 13 percent of the economists in our sample have never 
published in an EconLit-listed journal.  
  
2.2 The dependent variable: Individual annual research productivity 
EconLit indexes these days over 800 journals. It is quite evident that the quality standards 
set by these journals are quite diverse. As a consequence, publication-based bibliometric 
measures need to control for journal quality. This can be done by restricting the set of 
journals. We do, however, not believe that this is a viable strategy of measuring research 
output because a robust research indicator needs to draw on all available information. 
Using, for example, only a relatively small number of top-journals would bias the 
                                                 
5 Whenever EconLit reported “et al.” we identified the hidden co-authors by tracing the article.   9
indicator in favor of top-researchers specializing in hot topics. Moreover, life cycle 
patterns in research quality (as compared to cycles in overall output) can only be properly 
identified if the whole quality range of research products is taken into account.  
  To control for the quality of the journals indexed in EconLit we settled for a 
standard method proposed by Combes and Linnemer (2003).
6  Their “CLpn” scheme 
weighs quality according to the respective journal’s reputation and impact, and converts 
research output in standardized units of AER-page equivalents by also taking into account 
the number (p) of pages and the number (n) of co-authors. The imputed quality weights 
lie between unity for top journals and one twelfth for journals with the lowest quality 
standards. The top-tiered journals are the American Economic Review, Econometrica, the 
Journal of Political Economy, the Quarterly Journal of Economics and the Review of 
Economic Studies. Sixteen journals receive a weight of two thirds. Weights then decline 
in discrete steps (one half, one third, one sixth) down to the minimum weight of one 
twelfth.  
  To construct our dependent variable, the number of pages of each article is 
multiplied by the respective CL journal weight and this product is then divided by the 
number of authors. Adding the scores calculated according to this rule over all articles 
published by researcher i in year t, we arrive at our basic research productivity measure. 
To check for the robustness of our results, we have, however, also used an alternative 
journal-quality weighting scheme. We will explicitly refer to this robustness check when 
we discuss the respective results.  
                                                 
6 One disadvantage of using the CLpn scheme is that journal quality is kept constant over the 
period of investigation that covers, after all, a time-span of 36 years. Since, however, journal 
rankings exhibit a great deal of persistence (see, for example, Sutter and Kocher, 2001) and we 
assign journals to a small number of quality classes, changes in journal quality are not likely to 
cause severe problems.    10
2.3 The explaining variables 
To identify life cycle patterns in individual research productivity we regress our 
dependent variable, research productivity of researcher i at time t, on several independent 
variables, the most important one being experience or career-time.  
 
Experience 
In accordance with the literature we align all individual life cycles by using as the 
reference year the year in which the researchers obtained their doctoral degrees. In our 
regressions we do, however, also include the research output generated in the pre-Ph.D. 
years by letting the life cycles begins five years before the reference year zero. To 
estimate the shape of the lifecycles we include career-time polynomials of different 
orders in the regressions. Simple t-tests as well as likelihood ratio-tests were used to 
determine the optimal degree of the polynomial. In most cases a 5
th degree polynomial 
has proven to fit the data best.
7   
 
Individual heterogeneity 
It cannot be ruled out that publication habits vary across different fields of research. A 
simple comparison of the average yearly per capita research productivity across different 
fields reveals that this conjecture cannot be easily dismissed: these productivities range 
between 2.04 AER-equivalent pages in microeconomics and 0.42 AER-equivalent pages 
in our remainder group OTHER. We decided therefore to include the field of research as 
a dummy variable to allow for different research cultures across fields. A second reason 
for including field dummies is that these variables would also capture any bias stemming 
                                                 
7 Goodwin and Sauer (1995) come to a similar conclusion using their data on US economists.    11
from an uneven coverage of the research fields in the EconLit data base as a whole and/or 
within each quality-group of journals. The interpretation of field-specific effects on 
research productivity is therefore not straight-forward.  
  The gender issue has for a long time played a major role in labor economics and 
has, as a consequence, been taken up also in several studies of research productivity. We 
follow this tradition and include a gender variable that may capture gender specific 
differences in research productivity. 
 
Cohorts and historical time  
Research productivity may not only vary across different fields of economic research but 
also across historical time. To allow for vintage effects we include cohort dummy 
variables in our specification. They are constructed by using the reference year in which 
the researchers obtained their doctoral degrees, starting in 1963. 
  A second possibility is to include a time trend in the regressions. Just as cohort 
dummies, a time trend will capture changes of research behavior across historical time. 
Whereas cohort dummies portray changes in research behavior that are peer-group 
specific (they could, for example, portray different cultural imprinting patterns across 
time), a time trend indicates that individual research productivity does change over time 
for all researchers and this change is independent of experience. Such time trends might 
capture changes in publication customs, for example a substitution away from 
monographs and collected volumes towards journals. Unfortunately, a separate 
identification of linear cohort effects and a linear time-trend appears not to be possible 
since the difference between historical time and career age is used to assign the individual 
researcher to a cohort. Imposing specific functional forms to separate the two effects   12
appears to be a rather dubious strategy because there are no obvious restrictions that 
could be imposed.
8 In the following section we therefore present first our regression 
results that do not control for historical time effects, and then deal with the historical time 
problem explicitly in the subsection 3.2.  
 
3. Results 
3.1 Identifying life cycles in research productivity 
The set of explaining variables of our base-line lifecycle regressions consists of a career 
time polynomial, the cohort dummies, the gender dummy, the field dummies and a 
constant. The dependent variable Yit represents individual i’s research productivity as 
measured by our productivity index at career-time t. Because of the high degree of 
censoring (about ¾ of our Y-observations are zeroes) we cannot apply OLS and have to 
rely on techniques which can properly accommodate heavily censored data sets. The 






                                                 
8 Different restrictions and even small specification errors might have large effects on the 
estimates. For a discussion see Rodgers (1982). By including a time trend in addition to our cohort 
dummies we therefore would not gain much additional insights since the estimated effects would 
solely depend on the underlying functional forms and should therefore not be interpreted.   13
 
Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses, based upon a clustering robust Variance-Covariance Matrix on individual 
level. *** denotes significant at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level and * at the 10 percent level (applies to all 
tables). 
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 1.9989***             0.6394***           0.3885***          0.1819***          93.952***  
 (17.12)                  (11.26)                (19.23)                (7.28)                 (10.16) 
-2.413***             -0.9498***          -0.5097***         -0.2608***        -124.101***  
 (11.40)                   (9.58)                 (13.07)                 (5.37)                (8.20) 
 1.2635***             0.5809***           0.2908***          0.1519***         70.560*** 
 (7.76)                     (8.25)                  (9.47)                  (3.90)                (6.44) 
-0.2989***            -0.1550***          -0.0746***         -0.0386***         -18.142*** 
 (5.61)                     (7.19)                  (7.34)                  (2.93)                (5.20) 
 0.0260***              0.0149***          0.0070***          0.0035**           1.7090*** 
 (4.22)                      (6.31)                 (5.96)                 (2.26)                 (4.30) 
 0.6744                   0.0874                 0.1945               -0.1704              -7.5984 
 (0.76)                      (0.31)                 (1.18)                 (1.17)                 (0.15) 
 3.1352***              0.4203                0.5938***          0.0202               106.020* 
 (3.12)                      (1.55)                 (3.44)                 (0.13)                (1.90) 
 5.3574***              0.9202***          1.0030***          0.1052               213.806*** 
 (5.23)                      (3.48)                 (5.68)                 (0.72)                (3.62) 
 6.9861***             1.1961***           1.2231***          0.2166              276.024*** 
 (7.74)                      (4.88)                 (7.80)                 (1.63)                 (5.16) 
 8.5998***             1.3649***           1.4860***          0.2883**           325.609*** 
 (9.89)                      (5.79)                 (9.43)                 (2.39)                 (6.42) 
 8.0980***             1.3866***           1.3753***          0.4562***         512.220*** 
 (6.52)                      (5.05)                 (6.65)                 (2.78)                (6.20) 
 5.9956***             1.0372***           1.1500***          0.1440               324.030*** 
 (5.45)                      (3.89)                 (5.78)                 (0.93)                (5.15) 
 4.8836***             0.9315***           0.9688***          0.1329               273.39ß*** 
 (4.38)                      (3.46)                 (4.81)                 (0.85)                (4.40) 
 3.6397***             0.6340**             0.7692***        -0.0122                264.470*** 
 (3.07)                      (2.18)                 (3.51)                 (0.07)                (3.87) 
-3.8694***            -0.5504**           -0.6591***        -0.1345              -182.122*** 
 (4.57)                     (2.54)                  (4.45)                (1.08)                 (3.53) 
-18.911***            -2.4434***         -3.6847***         3.4968***        -1098.304*** 
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In the first column we present Tobit estimates using a 5th degree polynomial for career 
time. Column two shows the results obtained from a model presupposing an exponential 
conditional mean function that is estimated via nonlinear least squares:  
()( ) |e x p ' it it it it EY x x β ε =+ . 
In the following two columns we present estimates of a hurdle model. The hurdle model 
assumes that the decision to undertake research at all might be driven by other forces than 
the decision with respect to how much research effort is expended by an active researcher 
and is therefore parametrically richer than the Tobit model. We model the two stages of 
the decision making process as follows:  
()( )
() () () () , exp
exp 1 !





















                         where  () ( ) v x x it it it it ' exp , ' exp = = γ β λ  
 
The occurrence of non zero counts is modeled via a Poisson probability specification and 
conditional output is described using a truncated Poisson density.
9 The Poisson model 
appears to be appropriate since the observed density distribution of our dependent 
variable resembles the pattern of count data. This resemblance (spikes at steps of one 
twelfth) emerges because the CLpn-index is based on journal weights that are multiples 
                                                 
9 We also estimated a Negative Binomial specification for the conditional output (see Pohlmeier 
and Ulrich, 1995, for an example of a complete NegBin hurdle specification). The resulting 
estimates are well in line with the estimates of the Poisson specification.     15
of one twelfth. To arrive at proper count data we divided our dependent variable by one 
twelfth and rounded to the next integer. The transformed variable can then, of course, be 
analyzed by using a count data model in which one count can be interpreted as one 
twelfth of an AER-equivalent page or one page published in a journal of lowest quality.
10 
In the last column of Table I we present Tobit estimates if the weighting 
scheme of journal quality underlying the Combes and Linnemer (CL) measure of research 
output is replaced by the “KMS” weighting scheme proposed by Kalaitzidakis, 
Mamuneas and Stengos (2003) which covers only 159 Journals and gives top-journals a 
much larger weight than the CL scheme. The Journal of International Economics for 
example, the most highly regarded journal in its field, is allocated a relative weight of 2/3 
(as compared to the American Economic Review) in the CL scheme, whereas it receives a 
relative weight vis-à-vis the AER of only about 8% in the KMS scheme.  
  The estimates presented in Table I are not obscenely at variance with the 
standard life cycle hypothesis. As can be seen from the panels in Figure 1, the estimated 
career-time polynomials imply in each case a hump-shaped curve of research productivity 
over career time. All models fit best with a life cycle polynomial of degree five which 
gives rise to a peak in research productivity which occurs around the eights career year, 
i.e. when German academic economists are usually promoted to full professor. Even 
though the standard life cycle hypothesis passes the test reasonably well, we do not find a 
marked and final decline in research productivity after the initial peak. Research 
productivity rather appears to remain quite constant over a substantial part of the lifecycle 
                                                 
10 To check for the robustness of our results we additionally used ½ and ¼ of an AER-equivalent 
page as count units without obtaining significantly different results. However, since the underlying 
density has spikes at steps of one twelfth, the applied scheme appears to be more natural and 
precise. As an additional robustness check of our specification we estimated a hurdle model which 
assumes a lognormal distribution of the positive scores of Y (see Wooldridge, 2002). The results 
are similar to the ones obtained from the count data hurdle model presented above.     16
which implies that our estimates may just as well be construed to support the sociological 
hypothesis of imprinting.  
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The increase in research productivity towards the end of the researchers’ careers 
identified by both the exponential model and the hurdle model is in line with the results   17
presented by Goodwin and Sauer (1995). Their estimates for American economists show 
however a more substantial decline in research productivity during the mid-career years. 
Interestingly, the hurdle specification indicates that the probability of undertaking 
research and conditional research output follows somewhat different time patterns.  
Our estimation results documented in the first four columns of Table I do not 
appear to depend on the employed CL method of measuring research output. When 
research output is measured with the help of the KMS method, the Tobit estimates 
survive the robustness check with flying colors (see column 5, Table I, and Figure 1, 
panel 4). Also the hurdle model yields fairly similar results when the KMS measure is 
used (estimation results not shown); the career patterns documented in panel 5 of Figure 1 
reinforce our conclusion that one can lose important information when estimating 
publication incidence and conditional output together. The more marked drop in the 
conditional output is a consequence of the more top-heavy KMS quality weighting 
scheme and represents a clear sign that research quality changes as the economists’ 
careers progress. We will pursue this hypothesis further in section 4.   
  The coefficient of the gender dummy FEMALE indicates that female economists 
publish significantly less than their male peers. The hurdle model reveals however that 
this negative effect seems to be mainly due to the decision to engage in research activities 
at all rather than a consequence of a lower productivity of female economists who are 
active researchers. Tobit estimates of separate career time polynomials for male and 
female economists (estimation results not shown) show that female economists suffer a 
drop of research productivity beginning in their eight’s career year when they are about 
38 years old; they appear however to recuperate around the 18
th career year when they are 
about 48 years old (see Figure 1, panel 6). This well squares with the interpretation of a   18
“maternal leave from research”, especially if one allows for a one or even two years 
publication lag.
11  
  As expected, the coefficients of the cohort dummies increase over time.
12 We 
interpret this result to imply that members of younger cohorts are more productive 
researchers than their older peers. About the reasons for this phenomenon we can only 
speculate: the evidence certainly does not contradict the hypothesis that over the last 
thirty years the German economics profession has increasingly been exposed to the 
Anglo-Saxon research tradition that stresses the requirement to document one’s research 
efforts on a continuous basis. Many economists who returned in the 1970s and 1980s 
from the UK and the US were instrumental in sharing their experience with their graduate 
students who internalized this research culture which nowadays characterizes the 
academic environment at German graduate schools and dominates the increasingly 
competitive hiring strategy employed by the leading departments. In order to scrutinize 
the determinants of the identified cohort effects, we analyze below cohort-specific 
lifecycles which will be more informative than the pooled life-time productivities 
presented so far. 
  Although the Tobit estimates seem to be well in line with the results of the other 
estimators, a test for heteroscedasticity and a Pagan and Vella (1989) conditional moment 
test on normality of the underlying disturbance reject the hypotheses, thereby casting 
                                                 
11 Notice, that estimates of the career patterns of female economists are based on a rather small 
number of observations and need, therefore, to be interpreted with caution. Moreover, it is worth 
pointing out that even though the point estimates of the life cycle polynomials differ, this 
difference is statistically not significant. This might also be due to the small number of female 
economists.  
 
12 We estimated our baseline regression (column 1) also with ten year cohort dummies as well as a 
polynomial specification of the cohort effects. The results are in line with the results presented 
here. 
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doubt on the applicability of this estimator. This caveat probably does not come as a 
surprise, considering the count data character of the publication process. Since, however, 
the Tobit estimates are in accordance with to the other estimates this may be interpreted 
as a sign of the robustness of our results. Nevertheless, we now proceed to employ more 
robust econometric techniques.  
 
3.2 Quantile regressions and cohort-specific life cycles 
The semi-parametric censored quantile regression estimator for censored data developed 
by Powell (1984 and 1986) is more robust than the estimators used above because it 
allows the error terms to be heteroscedastic and non-normally distributed. Since we have 
to reject both of the hypotheses we now employ this estimator. We estimate the 75, 80, 
85, 90 and 95 percentiles. The results are depicted in the first panel of Figure 2 and the 
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   Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. We excluded researchers which never had a publication. For the cohort regressions     
   we also excluded researchers with a Ph.D. before 1969. Estimates are based on the Fitzenberger (1997) algorithm.   
   Standard Errors bootstrapped using Bilias et al. (2000) method (200 replications). 
 
 
The Figure reveals that the most productive researchers are much more productive than 
the less productive ones; more precisely, the line-up of individual research productivities 
(from low to high) is heavily skewed to the right. This feature (which is reflected in the 
figure by the fact that the distance between the percentile lines becomes increasingly 
Table II                                     Censored  
                                                      Quantile regressions      
                                                     0.85                    0.95     
                       Censored Quantile Regressions:  
                 Estimates by Cohort (0.85- Percentile) 
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 0.0250              -0.8927**  
 (0.12)                 (1.96)  
 1.1243***         2.456*** 
 (4.52)                 (3.28) 
 3..5250***        5.2910*** 
 (11.10)               (7.22) 
 5.0167***         7.9526*** 
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 6.8719***         9.4926*** 
 (12.80)               (13.17) 
 6.3848***         9.2334*** 
 (14.59)               (12.46) 
 4.4841***         4.8795*** 
 (12.41)               (8.48) 
 3.8014***         4.2405*** 
 (10.72)               (8.35) 
 3.1507***         2.7574*** 
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-2.491***         -3.0367*** 
 (6.26)                 (3.89) 
-7.870***         -5.6269*** 
 (14.84)               (8.99) 
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                                         4.804***   
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                                         (10.40)  
                                         3.882*** 
                                         (8.34) 
                                       -2..032***  
                                         (5.27)  
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larger) is a stylized fact of all distributions of research productivities. More interesting is 
perhaps the fact that this skewness appears to be pretty stable over career time. Most 
important for our argument is however that our main results gleaned from the less robust 
estimation models presented in the previous subsection are confirmed. 
 

































0 10 20 30
years after Ph.D.
Cohort 1969-74 Cohort 1975-80
Cohort 1981-86 Cohort 1987-92
Cohort 1993-98
Censored Quantile regression by cohort (0.85 Percentile)
 
 
Until now we used the whole sample of economists to estimate the shape of the 
productivity life cycles, allowing only for cohort-specific constant terms. It would, 
however, not be farfetched to assume that over the last thirty-five years the shape of the 
lifecycles may have been subject to significant changes. As we have argued above, 
increased competition between researchers or other institutional changes may have 
influenced research behavior. To account for this possibility we allow for separate time 
polynomials for each cohort using censored quantile regressions. The results are 
documented in Table II, columns 3-7, and in the second panel of Figure 2. This figure 
reveals that the productivity lifecycles of younger cohorts are – as far as one can tell from   22
the initial phases of these cycles - more hump-shaped than those of earlier cohorts.
13 The 
research behavior of the younger German economists thus appears to be much more in 
line with the predictions of the standard human capital approach to explaining changes in 
labor productivity than the research track record their older peers. This evidence supports 
the hypothesis that the German academic environment has become increasingly 
competitive over the last 35 years, with the consequence that the academics who entered 
the market later were forced to adopt a more and more narrow optimizing behavior if they 
wanted to be successful. As a result, the younger economists’ research behavior 
corresponds more closely to the predictions of the incentive-centered human capital 
approach to explaining labor market outcomes. 
  So far we have not exploited the panel structure of our dataset. To account for the 
multitude of fixed effects which are specific to the individual researchers, we use a 
quantile estimator due to Honoré (1992). It is semi-parametric and therefore robust with 
respect to distributional assumptions and generalizes our results in the sense that we now 
explicitly take individual specific fixed effects into account. The estimates are presented 
in Table 3.
14 As can be seen in Figure 3, the shape of the estimated career-time 
polynomial compares well with the pooled quantile estimates presented in Table 2.
15  Our 
previous results thus pass this robustness test with flying colors. 
 
                                                 
13 In an earlier paper (see Rauber and Ursprung, 2006) we have identified the same pattern of 
cohort-specific lifecycles by including cohort-specific career-time polynomial in a standard Tobit 
regression.   
14 We used the PANTOB estimation program written by Bo Honoré and J. Campbell. 
15 Note, however, that the levels of the cycles cannot be interpreted because they are governed by 
the individual effects. The stacking of the curves in Figure 3 therefore serves only to illustrate the 












           
     
     
 
         Notes: Absolute t-values in parentheses. We excluded researchers who never published or received   
            their Ph.D. before 1963. 
 
 
Figure 3: Semiparametric Fixed effects estimation (Honoré, 1992) 
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At this stage a caveat is called for. Over the last thirty-five years the publication habits in 
the German economics profession may have changed. If it is true that monographs and 
articles in collected volumes have become less important research outlets as compared to 
journal publications, this substitution process might be responsible for the large cohort 
effects we observe in our empirical analysis. 
Table III : Semiparametric Fixed Effects estimation (Honoré 1992)                                        
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  There is some evidence that the ratio of the number of active researchers and the 
number of journals slightly decreased over the last thirty years.
16 The crucial question 
thus is whether younger economists indeed publish significantly more than their older 
peers or whether the cohort effects identified above are simply due to dramatic changes in 
the publication habits. To disentangle these effects we follow the general approach 
advocated by Rodgers (1982): Since identification by functional form is rather arbitrary 
and even small specification errors might lead to large differences in the estimates, we 
make use of a proxy variable for the prevailing publication habits.  
  To pin down the development of publication habits we roughly estimated the co-
citation patterns of journal articles vis-à-vis other journal articles, articles in collected 
volumes, and monographs.
17 The percentage share of journal citations in journal articles 
indeed increases over time. The estimated time trend is depicted in Figure 4.
18 Since our 
measure of research output is truncated we cannot apply a trend correction before 
estimation. Such a procedure would not allow correcting for the marginal density of 
publication incidence. We therefore apply our correction after estimation, i.e. we rescale 
the estimated research life cycles of each cohort by multiplying each year’s estimated 
output by the ratio of the journal citation share in 2004 (which amounts to 60%) and the 
journal citation share in the respective year. We thereby obtain a correction which 
                                                 
16 Goyal, van der Leu and Moraga-Gonalez (2004) count the number of authors in EconLit: 33770 
in the 70’s, 48608 in the 80’s and 81217 in the 90’s. The number of journals indexed in EconLit in 
1975, 1985 and 1995 is 200, 311 and 535, respectively. Calculating author per journal ratios 
yields: 168.85, 156.3 and 151.          
17 We based our investigation on a random sample of articles published in the American Economic 
Review,  The European Economic Review,  Public Choice and the Jahrbücher für 
Nationalökonomie und Statistik an calculated the citation-shares of journals, monographs, 
collected volumes, working papers, and statistical sources for the years 1969, 1978, 1987, 1996 
and 2005. In total we classified 8824 citations.  
18 We approximated the original time series by fitting a quadratic polynomial. 
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represents an upper limit of the substitution of research output towards the learned 
journals.  
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The result of our correction exercise is depicted in the second panel of Figure 4. Even 
though we biased our test against the hypothesis of significant cohort effects in research 
productivity, this hypothesis survives the test easily. In other words, the younger German 
economists are so much more productive in producing journal articles than their older 
peers that the implied superiority in research productivity cannot be contested by any 
reasonable correction for the observed changes in publication habits.   
 
3.3 Ability-specific life cycles 
We now turn to analyzing to what extent the life cycles vary across groups of different 
academic achievements. This focus distinguishes our study from all those studies that 
investigate only a subset of highly productive individuals. Since we deal with many 
different types of researchers, we now relax the constraint of a uniform career-time 
polynomial for all individuals. We do so by applying a mixture model in the first stage of   26
the hurdle model.
19 The combined model performs two tasks: first, it endogenously 
allocates each researcher to an appropriate (ability-) group and, second, it estimates the 
life cycle parameters for each group. The likelihood function of the mixture model has the 
following appearance: 
() ( ) ( ) ∑
=
= = = = =
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() iT i i w w W ..., 1 =  represent all time-dependent covariates which are captured by a time 
polynomial up to order four. The probability of group affiliation is specified by a 
generalized logit function and the conditional output density follows a censored normal 
distribution. We estimated the mixture model separately for each cohort and assigned 
individuals to two different groups.
20 In each cohort, the model clearly identifies two 
different groups: journeymen researchers and accomplished researchers. About two thirds 
of all individuals are assigned into the journeymen group whereas one third is assigned 
into the accomplished group.  
  Since two different types of economists are identified, we re-estimated our hurdle 
model - this time allowing for separate lifecycles for the two groups. The results are 
depicted in Figure 5.  
 
 
                                                 
19 A different method which yields similar results is applied in Rauber and Ursprung (2006).   
20 Cohort specific estimation ensures that group assignment is not driven by the cohort effects 
which we identified above. We used the SAS estimation procedure TRAJ which maximizes the 
joint likelihood of the mixture model. For estimation details see Jones, Nagin and Roeder (2001). 
We settled here for two groups because more groups would give rise to an insufficient number of 
members in some of the groups and because such a division is also indicated by the Bayesian 
Information Criterion.   27
       Notes: Grouping was carried out using a mixture model as described in Section 3.3. Absolute t-
values in parentheses, based upon a clustering robust Variance-Covariance Matrix. We excluded 






Table IV: Ability groups 
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We observe that the probability of publication as well as the conditional output clearly 
differs across the two groups. More productive researchers appear to have incentives to 
publish a steady stream of papers until the end of their career. Reputation or intrinsic 
motivation might be a reason. Moreover, the conditional output of the accomplished 
researchers stabilizes at a much higher level than the output of the journeymen 
researchers. Needless to say, that these differences cannot be identified by simply 
focusing on a subset of highly productive individuals.  
 
4. An exercise in deconstruction: Quality, quantity and co-authorship  
Up to now we have treated research productivity as measured by the CLpn index as a 
preordained unit of account. The shapes of the identified life cycles suggest however that 
the constituent parts of this productivity measure might follow quite different patterns 
that cannot be uncovered by an investigation at the aggregate level. In this section we 
therefore deconstruct the employed index and focus our investigation on the constituent 
parts thereof, namely on quality, quantity and the number of collaborators. In order to   29
identify life-cycle patterns in these constituent parts of research productivity we 
“deconstruct” the density of our dependent variable in the following way: 
 
() ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) | | ,1 | , ,1 | , , ,1 == ⋅ = ⋅ = ⋅ = EE N N CC QQ f Y ENCQ f E f N E f C N E f Q C N E θθ θ θ
 
 
The first factor (E) on the RHS captures whether economist i has been involved in 
producing research output in year t or not. The second marginal density (N) represents the 
number of publications given that at least one publication has been produced in t. The 
third factor (C) denotes the average quantitative contribution per article (number of pages 
per coauthor) and the fourth factor (Q) the average quality of the articles authored or co-
authored by economist i in year t. An exemplary deconstruction of the score can be found 
in the Appendix. 
  The first column in Table V presents the regression for the number of authored or 
co-authored journal articles. As can be seen from the first panel of Figure 6, this number 
reaches a first maximum approximately seven years after German economists are granted 
their doctoral degrees and remains thereafter more or less constant for about ten years.  
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Notes: Absolute t-value in parentheses, based upon a clustering robust Variance-Covariance Matrix. Estimation methods: (1): 
Zero-Truncated Poisson regression; (2): OLS on Logarithm of average contribution; (3), (5): OLS on Logarithm of average 
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Around the middle of the career the number of publications begins to increase again and 
continues to do so until about five years before retirement. We will show below that this 
second increase is due to a higher co-authorship incidence of older economists. Whereas 
young economists appear to write most of their articles by themselves (and therefore 
publish only a few), older researchers tend to publish together with co-authors and 
therefore put their names on a larger number of papers. This increase in co-authorships   32
might be either due to network effects, or to the fact that senior economists more often 
write joint papers with the doctoral students they supervise. 
  In the second column of Table V our dependent variable is the logarithm of 
average research quantity (number of pages per article divided by the number of authors). 
Explanatory variables are our usual independent variables and the number of articles 
authored or coauthored. An inspection of the second panel of Figure 6 reveals that the 
average contribution per paper declines after an early career peak. The increased 
incidence of co-authorships of course contributes to the decline after the first peak. It thus 
transpires that at the beginning of their careers, economists, conceivably for reputation 
reasons, focus their research activity on relatively few projects that are pursued without 
collaborators, whereas at later stages they tend to spread themselves wider and prefer to 
engage more in collaborative research endeavors. The minor peak that can be found 
before retirement may be an artifact of the econometric specification, but it may also 
reflect a certain leaning of older economists to busy themselves with sweeping themes 
that require a lot of space to be developed.  
  The third and arguably most important constituent part of our measure of research 
productivity is (average) quality. Our regression results for the average research-quality 
variable are summarized in the third column of Table V. We regress the logarithm of the 
average quality on our independent variables, the number of articles published and the 
logarithm of the average research quantity.
21  
                                                 
21  The density of the quality variable is centered around the discrete steps of the underlying 
weighting scheme. To check for the robustness of the results we also transformed our quality 
measure into a variable that can assume six different values that correspond to the original journal 
quality weights. We then applied an ordered probit model to estimate the underlying quality 
lifecycle. The results are in line with the linear regression results presented here. 
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  As far as the “average economist” is concerned, it is fair to say that not only 
overall research productivity but also average research quality follows a hump-shaped 
lifecycle: the average quality sharply increases at the very beginning of the career as the 
budding economists become increasingly accomplished, but begins to decline already 
around the twelfth career year when the average German economist is about 42 years old. 
Since the average economist’s lifecycle in research productivity is relatively flat as 
compared to the identified lifecycle in research quality, this indicates that quantity is 
substituted for quality as the economist’s career progresses. In order to check whether this 
substitution process is ability specific, we estimated ability specific quality lifecycles by 
using a procedure advocated by Goodwin and Sauer (1995): We defined quintile ranks 
according to average lifetime productivity within each three years cohort of researchers. 
We then assigned each researcher the appropriate rank and included for the first, second, 
and the bottom three ranks separate career-time polynomials as well as researcher fixed 
effects in the regression.
22 In contrast to the endogenous grouping presented before, this 
procedure allows us to focus specifically on highly accomplished researchers. The results 
presented in panel 4 of Figure 6 indicates that top-performers are able to keep up research 
quality much more than their less gifted peers: the relative drop between the career years 
10 and 30 amounting to about 13% for the top researcher and 30% for the accomplished 
and journeymen researchers.
23 These results lend strong support to our notion that when 
measuring research productivity over the lifecycle it is imperative to include all types of 
journals; employing bibliometric approaches that focus on a subset of prime-rate journals 
                                                 
22 We bundled the bottom groups because of the high degree of censoring and because our main 
focus is on the high rate publishers. We excluded the oldest cohort because for these researchers 
we do not observe the first six post Ph.D. years and our ability indicator would therefore be biased.  
23 Oster and Hamermesh (1998) arrive at a similar result.   34
cannot detect patterns of research behavior that involve substitution of quantity for 
quality.  
  We now, finally, return to our hypothesis maintaining that co-authorship becomes 
more attractive as the average economist’s career progresses.
24 To explore this hypothesis 
in more detail, we construct a co-author index measuring each economist’s average 
number of collaborators (including him- or herself), by using the number of pages as the 
respective weight for each journal article published in the respective year. The regression 
explaining the number of co-authors is presented in the forth column of Table V. The 
implied life-cycle is depicted in the fifth panel of Figure 6. This figure reveals that the 
number of co-authors is relatively high for graduate students and reaches a minimum 
about three years after economists are conferred their doctoral degrees. Afterwards the 
number of co-authors steadily increases over the whole life-cycle. This piece of evidence 
points towards network advantages of more mature economists and, as far as the odd 
early-career twist is concerned, to a high incidence of collaborative efforts between 
graduate students and supervisors.  
  The last regression presented in Table V re-estimates the impact of our 
explanatory variables on the average quality of research without conditioning on the 
length or number of articles. As compared to the former regression we also included here 
our index of the average number of co-authors. It transpires that quality indeed depends 




                                                 
24 There is a small literature on the topic of co-authorship; see, for example, McDowell and Smith 
(1992), Hollis (2001), Laband (2002), and Sutter and Kocher (2004).    35
5. Conclusions 
In investigating the careers of German academic economists we have come across two 
characteristics that we regard to be essential for our understanding of the profession. First, 
we discovered that the pattern of research productivity over the life cycle is co-
determined by economic incentives and by sociological factors. The influence of the 
economic incentives is reflected in the hump-shape of the identified life cycles, the 
sociological factors show up in the marked cohort effects. As compared to the lifecycles 
of their American peers, the life cycles of German economists turn out to be flatter and 
the level of research productivity appears to depend much more on cohort specific 
factors. We do, however, not interpret these finding as evidence supporting the 
hypothesis that the American profession is mainly driven by economic incentives and the 
German profession by sociological factors. Our results simply reflect the fact the 
academic environment in Germany has changed much more dramatically over the period 
of our investigation than the science system in the United States. 
  The second uncovered characteristic of the economics profession that deserves 
special attention is the fact that lifecycles in research productivity are ability and gender 
specific. Studies that attempt to identify the research behavior of the “representative” 
economist miss a large part of the story. The economics profession is very heterogeneous 
and neglecting this heterogeneity may give rise to severe misinterpretations. It is worth 
emphasizing that this heterogeneity in ability not only affects the variance of the level of 
individual research productivity (this we have known for a long time from various 
ranking exercises), heterogeneity also has distinct effects on the dynamic dimension of 
research productivity, i.e. on the shape of the individual life cycles. The ability-induced   36
variation in life cycle patterns is especially striking when one compares life cycles in the 
quality of research. 
  As mentioned above, the fact that the life cycles in research productivity turn out 
to be rather flat in the German profession lends some support to the sociological 
imprinting hypothesis. This does, however, not imply that economic incentives are of 
second-order importance. Career hurdles, for example, may well provide incentives 
which have a great deal of influence: since we find early career peaks that appear to 
coincide with the timing of the only career hurdle in the traditional German science 
system, our results are certainly compatible with the existence of pre-tenure peaks and 
post-tenure kinks, and thus with the results derived by Backes-Gellner and Schlinghoff 
(2004). Moreover, we have found strong evidence suggesting that the marked increase in 
average research productivity across cohorts has been accompanied by a significant 
change in the career profiles: the research-productivity lifecycles of the youngest German 
economists closely resemble the lifecycles of their Anglo-Saxon peers. This implies that 
the observed process of catching-up with the most productive research systems is about to 
be accomplished not by changing the behavior of the profession at large but rather by 
letting the new generation of economists grow into an academic environment in which 
the behavior of the researchers is guided by economic incentives. Economic incentives 
thus do not appear to change accustomed behavioral patterns; incentives do however 
influence the behavior of the incoming generations of scientists. We thus arrive at the 
conclusion that research behavior is co-determined by economic and sociological factors. 
If one attempts to make a national science system catch up with the frontier of research, a 
time span of two generations appears to be a minimum: one generation to transfer and   37
implement the new spirit accompanied by the requisite institutional reforms, and one 
generation to overcome the acquired habits.    
  Finally, we would like to highlight a management consequence that arises from 
this study. Since life-cycle and cohort effects turn out to represent major determinants of 
research production in Germany, this information should be taken into account not only 
on the occasion of evaluating individual researchers, but also when one attempts to rank 
university departments, the reason being that the exogenous age and cohort structure of 
the departments significantly affects the observed research productivity. It therefore 
appears to be obvious that these effects should be deducted from the gross amount of 
research produced if one attempts to fairly represent a department’s research standing. 
Even though adjustments for career-age have been made in the ranking literature (see, for 
example, Combes and Linnemer, 2003), these adjustments were up to now based on an ad 
hoc reckoning. Our empirical study provides the kind of information that would have to 
be used in more sophisticated rankings. Our companion paper (2006) presents a new 












   38
References 
 
Backes-Gellner, U. and A. Schlinghoff (2004): Careers, incentives and publication 
  patterns of US and German (business) economists, 
 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=616822 
Baser, O. and E. Pema (2004): Publications over the academic life-cycle: Evidence for 
 academic  economists,  Economics Bulletin 1, 1-8. 
Bell, J. and J. Seater (1978): Publishing performance: Departmental an individual, 
  Economic Inquiry 16, 599-615. 
Bilias Y., S. Chen and Z.Ying (2000): Simple Resampling methods for censored 
Regression Quantiles, Journal of Econometrics 99, 373-386. 
Combes, P. and L. Linnemer (2003): Where are the economists who publish? Publication 
  concentration and rankings in Europe based on cumulative publications, Journal 
  of the European Economic Association 1, 1250-1308. 
Coupé, T. (2003): Revealed performances: Worldwide rankings of economists and 
  economics departments, 1990-2000, Journal of the European Economic 
 Association 1, 1309-1345. 
Coupé, T. (2004): What do we know about ourselves? On the economics of economics, 
 K yklos 57, 197-215. 
Coupé, T., V. Smeets and F. Warzynski (2003): Incentives in economic departments: 
  Testing Tournaments, Working Paper 03-25, Aarhus School of Business. 
Coupé, T., V. Smeets and F. Warzynski  (2006): Incentives, sorting and productivity 
  along the career: Evidence from a sample of top economists, Journal of Law, 
  Economics, and Organization 22, 137-167. 
Dnes, A. and N. Garoupa (2005): Academic tenure, post-tenure effort, and contractual 
 damages,  Economic Inquiry 43, 832-839. 
Fitzenberger, B. (1997): A Guide to Censored Quantile Regressions, in G.S. Maddala and 
C.R. Rao (eds.), Handbook of Statistics, Volume 15, 405-437. 
Frey, B. (2007): Evaluierungen, Evaluierungen … Evaluitis, Perspektiven der 
Wirtschaftspolitik 8, 207-220. 
Goodwin, T.H. and R.D. Sauer (1995): Life cycle productivity in academic research: 
  Evidence from cumulative publication histories of academic economists, 
  Southern Economic Journal, 728-743. 
Goyal, S. and van der Leu, M. and J. L. Moraga-Gonzales (2004): Economics: An 
emerging small world? CESifo Working Paper No. 1287. 
Grimes, P.W. and C.A. Register (1997): Career Publications and academic job rank: 
  Evidence from the class of 1968, Journal of Economic Education 28, 82-92. 
Hartley, J.E., J.W. Monks and M.D. Robinson (2001): Economists’ publication patterns, 
  The American Economist 45, 80-85.   39
Hollis, A. (2001): Co-authorship and the Output of Academic Economists, Labour 
 Economics 8,  503-30. 
Honoré, B.E.(1992): Trimmed Lad and Least Squares Estimation of Truncated and 
Censored Regression Models with Fixed Effects, Econometrica 60, 533-565. 
Hutchinson, E.B. and T.L. Zivney (1995): The publication profile of economists, Journal 
 of  Economic  Education, 59-79. 
Jones, B.L. Nagin, D.S. and Roeder K. (2001): A SAS Procedure Based on Mixture 
Models for Estimating Development Trajectories, Sociological Methods & 
Research 29, 374-393.  
Kalaitzidakis, P., Mamuneas, T. and T. Stengos (2003): Rankings of academic Journals 
and Institutions in economics, Journal of the European Economic Association 1, 
1346-1366.  
Kenny, L. and R. Studley (1995): Economists’ salaries and lifetime productivity, 
  Southern Economic Journal 65, 382-393. 
Laband, D. (2002): Contribution, Attribution and the Allocation of Intellectual Property 
  Rights: Economics versus Agricultural Economics, Labour Economics 9, 125-31. 
McDowell, J. and J. Smith (1992): The Effect of Gender-Sorting on Propensity to 
  Coauthor: Implications for Academic Promotion, Economic Inquiry 30, 68-82. 
Moore, W., R. Newman and G. Turnbull (2001): Reputational capital and academic pay, 
  Economic Inquiry 39, 663-671. 
Oster, S.M. and D.S. Hamermesh (1998): Aging and productivity among economists, 
  Review of Economics and Statistics 80, 154-156. 
Pagan, A., and F. Vella: Diagnostic Tests for Models Based on Individual Data: A 
Survey, Journal of Applied Econometrics, 4, Supplement, 1989, pp. 29-59. 
Pohlmeier W. and V. Ulrich (1995): An Econometric Model of the Two-Part 
  Decisionmaking Process in the Demand for Health Care, The Journal of Human 
  Resources 30, 339-361. 
Powell, J.L. (1984): Least Absolute Deviations Estimation for the Censored Regression 
Model, Journal of Econometrics 25, 303-325. 
Powell J. L. (1986): Censored Regression Quantiles, Journal of Econometrics 32, 143-
155 
Rauber M. und H. Ursprung (2006): Evaluation of researchers: A life cycle analysis of 
German academic economists, CESifo Working Paper No. 1673. 
Rodgers W. L. (1982): Estimable Fuctions of Age, Period, and Cohort Effects, American 
Socilogical Review 47, 774-787. 
Skirbekk, V. (2004): Age and Individual Productivity: A Literature Survey, In G. 
Feichtinger, ed., Vienna Yearbook of Population Research, Vienna, Austrian 
Academy of Sciences Press: 133-153 
Stephan, P. (1996): The economics of science, Journal of Economic Literature 34, 1199-
 1235.   40
Sutter, M. and M. Kocher (2001): Tools for evaluating research output: Are citation-
based rankings of journals stable? Evaluation Review 25, 555-566. 
Sutter, M. and M Kocher (2004): Patterns of co-authorship among economics 
departments in the U.S., Applied Economics 36, 327-333. 
Wooldridge, J. (2002): Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. The MIT 
Press Cambridge M.A. 
Van Dalen, H. (1999): The golden age of Nobel economists, American Economist, 19-35 
 




Exemplary Density Deconstruction 
 




the other one without co-author (15 pages, quality
2
1
). The Output (Y) is then calculated as:  
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The number of pages attributed to the author is denoted by 
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We then simply divide Yit through Pit to arrive at the average quality for year t:  
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= = it Q . 
 
To compute the average (quantitative) contribution per paper we divide Pages through the number 
(here 2) of articles written. This is a measure of the average contribution (measured in pages; here 
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